The open method of coordination – effectively preventing welfare state retrenchment? by Büchs, Milena
European Integration online Papers / ISSN 1027-5193
    Special Issue 1, Vol. 13 (2009), Art. 11 
How to cite? 
Büchs, Milena. 2009. The Open Method of Coordination - Effectively preventing welfare state retrenchment? 
In: Kröger, Sandra (ed.): What have we learnt: Advances pitfalls and remaining questions in OMC research, 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 1, Vol. 13, Art. 11, 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-011a.htm. 
DOI: 10.1695/2009011 
The Open Method of Coordination - Effectively preventing welfare 
state retrenchment?* 
Milena Büchs 
University of Southampton, United Kingdom 
E-Mail: m.buechs@soton.ac.uk 
Abstract: This article re-examines the division between “optimists” and “pessimists” within 
the literature on the Open Method of Coordination’s (OMC) effectiveness. Each of those 
“camps” tends to focus on a different question. “Optimists” are more concerned with the 
question of whether the OMC exerts an influence on the national level and through which 
mechanisms, whilst “pessimists” concentrate on the question of whether the OMC can 
“strengthen” EU social policy and therefore European welfare states. This article combines
these two perspectives and argues that the OMC is indeed capable of influencing national 
policies through the dissemination of ideas and “learning” as the “optimists” stress. However, 
policy “learning” at the member state level is shaped and constrained by a variety of internal
and external pressures. Against the hopes of most of the OMC “optimists”, this makes the 
OMC largely ineffective in preventing welfare state retrenchment. 
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1. Introduction  
This article argues that the debate about the Open Method of Coordination’s (OMC) 
effectiveness is somewhat confounded because “optimists” and “pessimists” tend to focus on 
different questions. For a better understanding of how the OMC operates and what it can 
achieve, it is important to make these underlying questions more explicit. In short, “optimists”
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focus on the question of whether the OMC can exert an influence on the national level and if 
so, through which mechanisms. Here, they focus on the OMC’s role for the dissemination of 
ideas, deliberation and “policy learning”, all of which are seen as new and potentially powerful 
mechanisms of supranational influence on member states (Jacobsson 2004; Trubek and Trubek 
2005; Visser 2009; Zeitlin 2009; see Kröger, this issue, for a critical account). In contrast, 
“pessimists” are, even though sometimes implicitly, more interested in the question of whether
the OMC can “strengthen” EU social policy and, consequently, help to prevent European
welfare state retrenchment. They regard the introduction of the OMC as a political 
compromise that aims to strengthen EU social policy against the EU’s economic objectives but 
has to rely on soft coordination due to a range of barriers to the adoption of legally binding 
social policy frameworks at the EU level. To them, the OMC is only a second best solution 
which is too weak to influence national social policies as market integration is still prevalent at 
the EU level, exerting pressures on national welfare states (e.g. Chalmers and Lodge 2003; 
Kröger 2008; Scharpf 2002).  
This article will argue that both sides within this debate make valuable points which can 
potentially be combined. Essentially, it can be argued that the OMC is indeed capable of 
influencing national policies through the dissemination of ideas and legitimatory discourses 
whilst the ways in which these ideas are interpreted and implemented at the national level are 
shaped and limited by a range of internal and external pressures on welfare states. This makes 
the OMC largely ineffective in preventing welfare state retrenchment; in fact, it may even 
contribute to it – particularly in the more developed and generous welfare states within the EU.
This article understands welfare state retrenchment as a cut in social expenditure, decreasing 
generosity of provision, limitation of social rights or a deterioration of outcomes that the 
welfare state aims to improve such as poverty and social inequality (1). In contrast, 
“strengthening” “social Europe” is a more comprehensive term used by the European Union 
itself (European Council 2000). It can be broadly understood as a combination of a stronger 
focus on social policy (against economic objectives) at the EU level with a subsequent 
improvement of social outcomes at member state level, in particular in relation to poverty 
reduction and social inclusion (European Council 1997; European Council 2000) (2). 
“Strengthening” can therefore refer to either the EU or the member state level, or both in
combination. I will distinguish these different meanings by using “strengthening” “the social 
dimension” for the EU level, “welfare states” for the national level and “social Europe” for 
both in combination.  
To re-examine the debate between OMC “optimists” and “pessimists”, this article will proceed 
as follows. Section two will compare the arguments of OMC “optimists” and “pessimists”. 
This comprises their views on, first, whether – and if so through which mechanisms – the 
OMC can exert an influence at the national level and, second, the OMC’s potential to 
strengthen “social Europe”.  
Sections three and four seek to assemble empirical evidence for the argument that the OMC is 
unlikely to effectively prevent welfare state retrenchment. Section three will focus on an 
analysis of the OMC’s policy content in order to establish whether it is more likely to 
strengthen social Europe or promote welfare state retrenchment. Section four will analyse 
social policy outcomes of the last 15 years within the EU-15, using OECD and Eurostat data, 
to review the question of whether Europe’s welfare states have been strengthened during this 
time.  
Critical readers might question the appropriateness of this approach in analysing the OMC’s 
potential role in preventing or promoting welfare state retrenchment. They will argue that 
several steps lie between the promotion of ideas and eventual policy outcomes such as social 
spending, poverty and inequality. Indeed, to reconstruct how the OMC is operating, one needs 
to analyse how national policy actors interpret the ideas promoted through the OMC, how 
these ideas are then translated into concrete national policies and how those policies influence 
policy outcomes, dependent on a variety of other factors such as political situation and 
institutions, policy implementation “on the ground” (including behavioural choices of potential 
benefit or service recipients), economic growth and employment, demographic trends, etc. 
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Whilst such a micro-level qualitative approach is a necessary and useful tool to provide 
insights into the ways in which the OMC operates, it has not been chosen in this article for 
several reasons. First, a range of in-depth studies has already been undertaken examining the 
ways in which the OMC is used by national policy actors and how it might have influenced 
concrete policies (e.g. Büchs 2007; De la Porte 2008; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Kröger 
2008; Zeitlin, Pochet, and Magnusson 2005). The main insight arising from those studies is 
that if the OMC plays a role for national policy making, it mainly exerts an influence on policy 
frameworks and justifications (e.g. Büchs 2007; De la Porte 2008; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 
2009; Zeitlin 2009). Some authors also observed an impact on governance processes or even, 
in a few cases, on concrete policies (ibid.). In addition, empirical evidence on welfare state 
development in Europe demonstrates that there has been a shift during the last decade towards 
a greater emphasis on activation, particularly in labour market and social assistance policy, but 
also in other areas of the welfare state (e.g. Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; Serrano 
Pascual and Magnusson 2007; Van Berkel and Nornemann Møller 2002). Several authors 
within the activation literature assume that whilst a variety of factors has influenced this 
development, the OMC may have played a role in disseminating the activation concept (ibid.). 
This article can build upon the insights of the OMC and activation literatures instead of re-
examining these processes in detail. Second, as these in-depth examinations of micro-
processes are very time-consuming, they are usually confined to a few case studies the results 
of which cannot easily be generalised to the whole EU. In addition, micro- and macro 
processes simply focus on different questions: Qualitative case studies examine the ways in 
which the OMC operates whilst the macro-approach chosen here is interested in potential links 
between the OMC and policy outcomes which cannot be examined at the micro-level. Finally, 
this article does not claim that it can prove the existence of a link between the OMC and policy 
outcomes on the basis of the chosen macro-perspective. This article merely maintains that if 
we can assume that the OMC has the potential to influence national policy frameworks – a 
conclusion that results from twelve years of previous research on the OMC – then there is the 
possibility that the OMC further translated into policies and policy outcomes. In other words, 
if poverty rates and levels of inequality declined, the OMC might have contributed to 
strengthening social Europe. However, if policy outcomes deteriorated, we can conclude that 
the OMC either did not have the capacity to prevent welfare state retrenchment, i.e. other 
factors must have been more powerful, limiting any opposite influence by the OMC, or the 
OMC might even have contributed to these outcomes, for example by providing justifications 
for benefit cuts, greater benefit conditionality, etc. The word “might” needs to be emphasised 
here, this article does not claim that it can demonstrate these links; in addition, it always 
assumes that a range of other factors play a role within the “black boxes” between ideas, policy 
formulation, policy implementation and outcomes. Rather, the empirical evidence serves as 
thought-provoking impetus to review the arguments provided by OMC “optimists” and 
“pessimists” and consider ways in which these arguments could fruitfully be re-assembled.  
2. OMC effectiveness: “optimists” and “pessimists”   
This section compares the positions of OMC “optimists” and “pessimists”, in relation to, first, 
the ways in which the OMC operates and, second, possible links between the OMC, EU social 
policy and national welfare states. These two aspects need to be more clearly distinguished as 
they are sometimes confounded in debates about the OMC’s effectiveness.  
2.1. The “optimists”   
2.1.1. Operation of the OMC  
The conceptualisation of the ways in which the OMC operates is at the heart of OMC 
“optimists” interest. Important aspects within this area are the debates about “soft law” and 
“policy learning”.  
As OMC instruments such as objectives, guidelines and targets are not legally binding, they 
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can be regarded as “soft law”, defined as non-legally binding rules “which nevertheless may 
have practical effects” (Snyder 1993: 198). OMC “optimists” have argued that “soft law” may 
be effective despite its non-bindingness because it allows for policy experimentation and better
problem definition on the ground as it facilitates decentralised policy-making and the 
involvement of a range of policy actors in policy-making (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Dorf and 
Sabel 1998; Trubek and Trubek 2005). “Optimists” therefore regard soft law as more suitable 
than hard law for operating within a context of diversity in which different policy solutions are 
required in different member states. In addition, OMC optimists have argued that soft law may 
be more effective than hard law and induce long-lasting policy learning (instead of just 
superficial behaviour change) because it has the potential to influence deep-seated values and 
attitudes (Jacobsson 2004; Trubek and Trubek 2005).  
“Policy learning” has been identified by OMC “optimists” as one of the main mechanisms 
through which the OMC operates and gains influence at the national level. “Policy learning”
refers to the cognitive basis of policy-change. According to Hall (1993), policy change is most
thorough if it includes a change of underlying paradigms (third order change) (ibid.: 279). 
Such paradigm change occurs through policy learning, based on voluntary and rational 
assessment of past experience and new information (ibid.: 278). “Optimists” believe that the 
OMC facilitates “policy learning” through the regular exchange of ideas, deliberation, peer 
reviews, diffusion of discourses, “socialisation”, and bottom-up experimentation (Eberlein and 
Kerwer 2004; Heidenreich 2009; Jacobsson 2004; Trubek and Trubek 2005; Visser 2009; 
Zeitlin 2009; but also Kröger and Hartlapp, this issue, for an overview of critical accounts of 
learning).  
2.1.2. The OMC and social Europe  
Even though “optimists” focus less on this question, they generally believe that the OMC can 
strengthen “social Europe”. This refers both to the status of social policy at the EU level as 
well as the performance of national welfare states. For example, authors such as Ferrera and 
Rhodes stated that “(t)he European Union, acting as a ‘semi-sovereign’ policy system, seems 
slowly but surely to be carving out a distinct ‘policy space’ regarding social policy – a space 
which may gradually work to rebalance ‘softly’ and ‘from below’ the current structural 
asymmetry between negative and positive integration” (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000: 278). In 
addition, OMC “optimists” believe that the OMC can strengthen national welfare states and 
their performance by promoting their necessary “modernisation” or “recalibration”. For 
example, de la Porte and Pochet (2002a) regarded the OMC as a potential means to “building 
social Europe” and Trubek and Trubek (2005: 353) state that the OMC can help member states 
to “fend off any ‘race to the bottom’ pressures without the need for a centralised 
straightjacket” (also see Heidenreich 2009: 32).  
2.2. The “pessimists”  
2.2.1. Operation of the OMC  
“Pessimists” criticise the assumption that the OMC is able to influence national policy-making 
through the diffusion and exchange of ideas. Here, they mainly stress the fact that the OMC 
objectives and guidelines are not legally binding and that there are no “hard” sanctions if 
member state governments do not follow the EU’s advice (e.g. Chalmers and Lodge 2003; 
Idema and Kelemen 2006; Kröger 2009; Scharpf 2002; see also Kröger, this issue, for further 
points of criticism). In addition, “pessimists” sometimes refer to the importance of national 
institutions and path dependency, stressing that OMC recommendations and targets are 
unlikely to have a significant influence on national policies if large “misfits” exist between 
them and national institutions (e.g. Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Kröger 2009: 206).  
2.2.2. The OMC and social Europe   
The “pessimists’” sceptical response to the “optimists’” “policy learning” approach is mainly 
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due to their different stance regarding the question of whether the OMC can “strengthen social 
Europe”. “Pessimists” doubt that the OMC is powerful enough to balance “negative” and 
“positive integration” (Scharpf 2002) and improve national welfare state performance. Here, 
they stress that the OMC is subordinated to the legally binding framework of negative 
integration, the Economic and Monetary Union and economic policy coordination (Büchs 
2007; Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Kröger 2008; Offe 2003; Scharpf 2002; Kröger this issue; 
Schäfer and Leiber this issue). “Pessimists” therefore assume that European integration 
continues to be a potential challenge for national welfare states because the creation of the 
single market increases competitive pressures that might lead to a downward adjustment of 
social standards. Furthermore, through the creation of the European Monetary Union, 
governments within the Eurozone lost the power to set exchange and interest rates as 
instruments of economic policy which may put additional direct pressure on welfare systems. 
Prices, including wages and social security contributions, also became more transparent. 
Critics therefore fear that this increases competition among economic sectors across Europe, 
including wage levels. Furthermore, the limits for overall and annual state deficits defined by 
the Stability and Growth Pact potentially restrict government expenditure and discourage anti-
cyclical government spending (Martin and Ross 2004; see Niechoj this issue) (3).  
However, the “pessimistic” literature on the OMC and social Europe so far does not refer to
the wider literature on welfare state retrenchment (Castles 2007; Green-Pedersen 2004; Korpi 
2003; Scruggs 2006; Starke 2006; Swank 2005). Many authors within the welfare state 
retrenchment debate emphasise that globalisation and Europeanisation are not the only, and 
perhaps not the most important, factors that exert pressures on welfare states but that post-
industrialism and demographic and family change may present equally significant challenges 
(e.g. Pierson 2001b). In my view, it is important to take these arguments into account to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of the context within which the OMC is operating. 
Structural economic change is regarded as additional pressure because the expansion of the 
services sector decelerates economic growth as this sector provides less scope for increasing 
productivity. Declining economic growth implies less employment growth and potentially 
increasing unemployment which subsequently adds to budgetary pressures (ibid.; Bonoli 2005; 
Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Tayler-Gooby 2004).  
In addition, demographic change or “ageing societies”, due to declining population growth in 
developed countries and higher life expectancy, are thought to exert further pressure on 
welfare states because the size of the working age population that contributes to state revenues 
and social security funds is decreasing whilst the demand and need for pension, health and 
long-term care expenditure is continually increasing (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Pierson 
2001a; Pierson 2001b).  
Overall, the debate between “optimists” and “pessimists” appears to be clear-cut – even though 
they tend to concentrate on different aspects of OMC effectiveness. Why should this orderly 
configuration be challenged? If national welfare state performance is improving/deteriorating 
should we not simply assume that the “optimists”/”pessimists” are right respectively? There 
are two reasons why this article seeks to question this view. First, we need to establish what 
types of policies the OMC promotes. If its policy contents are open enough to be interpreted 
and used by national policy actors in order to legitimise welfare state retrenchment, it is 
possible that it exerts an influence through “policy learning” as suggested by the “optimists”. 
However, this may happen in ways that are shaped and limited by existing pressures on 
welfare states so that the OMC fails to prevent retrenchment as feared by the pessimists. 
Second, a range of empirical, in-depth studies has already been published demonstrating an 
influence of the OMC on national policy frames or even concrete policies (e.g. Büchs 2007; 
De la Porte 2008; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Zeitlin, Pochet, and Magnusson 2005). In 
some of these cases, national governments have used the OMC to legitimise unpopular welfare 
state reforms that had considerable retrenching effects. For example, the radical labour market 
policy reform in Germany (commonly called “Hartz” reform) that resulted in a cut of benefits 
for long-term unemployed, greater conditionality and generally decreasing passive and active
labour market policy spending per unemployed population has been justified by the 
government with references to the European Employment Strategy and examples from other 
member states that had already introduced similar reforms (Büchs 2007; Seeleib-Kaiser and 
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Fleckenstein 2007). If an evaluation of welfare state performance of the last 15 years 
demonstrates a deterioration of welfare state performance it is not impossible that the OMC 
has facilitated retrenching policy reforms by providing necessary legitimatory discourses. 
However, before evaluating welfare state performance across the whole EU-15, we need to 
analyse the OMC’s policy content to establish whether it has the potential to promote
“strengthening” or “retrenchment” of social policy frameworks.  
3. What welfare state does the OMC promote?   
The first question that needs to be discussed when analysing the OMC’s policy orientation is 
whether the OMC has been designed to be a subordinated tool that helps the EU becoming the 
most competitive economy in the world or an instrument to balance positive and negative 
integration. A first indication can be derived from the ways in which the OMC, the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) and the EU’s strategy to coordinate economic policies relate to 
each other. Here it can be argued that the EU’s economic objectives and policies still take 
priority over the EES and particularly the OMC on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
(SPSI) (De la Porte and Pochet 2002b; Dieckhoff and Gallie 2007; Radaelli 2003). For 
example, the EES is required to be ‘consistent with the broad guidelines of the economic
policies of the Member States and of the Community’ (Art. 126, Treaty of the European 
Communities) through which the member states are generally obliged to pursue economic 
policies coherent with “the principle of an open market economy with free competition (…), 
stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of 
payments” (Art. 4, Treaty of the European Communities). The mechanism for economic policy 
coordination and the EES have been linked even more closely to each other as the set of 
guidelines for both mechanisms is now published in just one document, the “Integrated 
Guidelines”. This integration was adopted through the Lisbon Strategy revision in 2005 which
put a new emphasis on growth and jobs, de-emphasising the OMC SPSI. The strategy for 
economic policy coordination focuses on the promotion of “sustainable” growth and finances, 
a “dynamic and well-functioning European Monetary Union”, wage levels that promote 
growth, investment in research and development, enhanced competitiveness, as well as the 
completion of the Single Market (CEC 2007).  
Whilst several authors have criticised this asymmetry between EU economic and social 
policies (e.g. Scharpf 2002), it is arguable to what extent the OMC SPSI was ever meant to be 
a counter-weight to the EU’s economic objectives. When it was launched in 2000 as part of the
Lisbon Strategy, the OMC SPSI was only part of a package that set the new strategic goal for 
the EU to become the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world” (European Council 2000, see Dawson this issue; Flear this issue).  
However, a closer scrutiny of the ways in which the EU portrays the OMC is required. Here, 
two main themes can be identified, the first of which focuses on “strengthening”, the second 
on “modernising” or “adapting” the European Social Model. Whilst these two themes are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, they potentially provide different frames of interpretation and 
expectations as to what the EU should achieve in the area of social policy.  
The theme of “strengthening” social Europe relates to two different aspects. The first
emphasises the need to “reinforce”, “improve” (European Council 2000) and “preserve” (CEC 
1994: 7) the “European Social Model”. This narrative also stresses that the EES and OMC 
strengthen the EU’s role in social policy, implying that this improves the balance between the
EU’s economic and social objectives (European Council 2000: paragraph 12). The second
refers to improving the outcomes of European social policy, for example in terms of 
“strengthening social cohesion”, “eradicating poverty” (European Council 2000) and 
strengthening the dialogue between the social partners (European Council 1997: paragraph 
18).  
The theme of “modernising” European welfare states highlights the need to adapt existing 
systems of social protection to structural economic changes, globalisation and ageing societies 
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through an “active” and “sustainable” welfare state. 
What concrete approaches does the OMC promote to “modernise” the “European Social 
Model”? Are those approaches potentially protecting from or contributing to welfare state 
retrenchment?  
The EES and the OMC SPSI seek to tackle the problems of unemployment and social 
exclusion through the “modernisation of social protection systems” (EES GL 17 2008), 
elsewhere characterised as “activation” (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; Van Berkel 
and Nornemann Møller 2002). Accordingly, the EES and OMC SPSI aim to increase labour 
market participation, “make work pay” and thereby prevent unemployment and social 
exclusion. The philosophy behind this approach is that a job is the best “safeguard” against 
poverty and social exclusion (European Council 2000) and that only “full employment” can 
contribute to economic growth (CEC 2007). The EES emphasises that greater work incentives 
should be created particularly for“disadvantaged people and the inactive” (CEC 2007: GL 19) 
to enhance social inclusion. In addition, the OMC SPSI emphasises equal opportunities, the 
fight against discrimination, and “access for all to the resources, rights and services needed for 
participation in society” (European Council 2006).  
In relation to the goal of “full employment”, the EES promotes a “lifecycle approach to work”
with a particular focus on increasing employment rates of younger and older people (CEC 
2007: GL 17, 18) as well as a better re-conciliation of work and family life, for example 
through improved parental leave schemes and childcare provision (see Weishaupt this issue). 
In addition, the EES promotes “flexicurity” (that is more flexible labour markets combined 
with employment security), wage levels that do not exceed productivity growth and “reflect 
the labour market situation”, as well as the reduction of non-wage labour costs (CEC 2007: GL 
21).  
Is this approach able to “strengthen” European welfare states? This very brief review of the
key EES and OMC SPSI objectives demonstrates that whilst both eventually aim to strengthen 
the EU’s competitiveness and growth, there is also a strong emphasis on social inclusion, the
fight against poverty and equal opportunities. An additional difficulty in characterising the 
OMC’s policy content is based on the fact that “activation” policies can be differently 
interpreted. The academic discussion about activation is divided. First there are those who 
regard it as a promising approach to “modernise” or “recalibrate” welfare states, helping them 
to survive the challenges that they are faced with (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Ferrera and 
Rhodes 2000). Indeed, activation has the potential to create better access to labour markets as 
well as training opportunities for previously long-term unemployed people and “hard to reach”
groups, some of which may previously not have been eligible for such measures.  
However, and particularly if activation is understood in a wider sense as an “activation of the 
whole systems of social protection” (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004), it can, second, 
also be understood as a means of “re-commodification” and restriction of social citizenship 
rights (Handler 2003; Serrano Pascual 2007). This is because “activation” is often linked to a 
transformation of guaranteed social rights into “social contracts” according to which the social 
right needs to be “earned”, for example through the acceptance of training or work
opportunities which do not necessarily have to match the citizen’s previous level of 
qualification or area of residence (Handler 2003; Serrano Pascual 2007). More generally, 
activation policies are frequently linked to discourses mentioned above which locate the cause 
of unemployment or social exclusion within the individual, e.g. based on the deterioration of 
skills, lack of self-motivation and confidence, “benefit dependency”, or laziness 
(“deservingness”), rather than economic or structural circumstances (Serrano Pascual 2007:
14f.). Therefore, the policy solutions focus on changing individuals’ attitudes, behaviour and 
skills rather than fostering demand for labour or a more general redistribution of wealth (ibid.). 
Whether or not “activation” policies have a retrenching effect therefore also depends on how 
they are interpreted and designed.  
An additional major problem that the OMC identifies is the impact that ageing societies and 
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decreasing population growth are likely to have on the “financial sustainability” of social 
protection systems, in particular pension, health and long-term care systems. The OMC SPSI 
therefore recommends measures designed to achieve pension levels that are both “adequate”
and “financially sustainable” (European Council 2006). Also in relation to health care the 
OMC stresses “access for all to adequate health and long-term care” which shall remain both 
affordable and financially sustainable (ibid.).  
Again, the OMC SPSI seeks to strike a balance between two objectives that bear a tension. The 
first has potentially “preserving” effects as it recommends “adequate” pension levels “which 
allow people to maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after 
retirement” (European Council 2006: d). The second, emphasising the “financial 
sustainability” of European pension systems, bears more of a retrenchment potential as the 
looming “cost explosion” of pension systems is likely to be addressed by cutting the generosity 
of pension payments, expanding the private and occupational pillars of pension systems and 
prolonging working lives.  
Overall, whilst the OMC is structurally sub-ordinated to the EU’s economic goals and policies, 
its various objectives and guidelines contain different and sometimes conflicting elements, 
some of which are more likely to be interpreted in ways that promote welfare state 
“strengthening” whilst others are more likely to support “retrenchment”. Key concepts 
disseminated through the OMC, for instance activation, are inherently open to interpretation 
and can be implemented in ways that either lead to an expansion of active labour market 
policies and greater inclusion or to benefit cuts and stricter eligibility and conditionality. How 
national policy actors interpret OMC objectives and translate them (implicitly or explicitly) 
into national policies, will depend on a wide range of factors, including the existing welfare 
regime, financial capacities, political leadership and power constellations, public opinion, 
economic situation, etc.  
4. Welfare state performance  
This section will analyse welfare state performance within the EU-15 since the early or mid-
1990s, depending on data availability, to establish whether or not the OMC could have had a 
strengthening effect on the EU-15 member states. The main criteria examined here are social
expenditure, particularly in the areas of labour market and pension policy, as well as 
developments in relation to poverty and social inequality.  
Before analysing social expenditure and welfare state performance it needs to be emphasised 
that, based on un/employment rates, the labour market performance has on average improved 
during the last decade within the EU. The employment rate of the working age population in 
the EU-15 has continually risen from 60.3 per cent in 2006 to 67.3 per cent in 2008. Even
more pronounced was the increase of the employment rate of those aged 55-64 as well as the 
female employment rate both of which rose by more than ten percentage points between 1996 
and 2008. Conversely, the unemployment rate decreased from 10.1 per cent in 1996 to 7.1 per 
cent 2008 whilst the rate of working-age (15-64) economic inactivity also shrank from 32.5 per 
cent in 1996 to 27.5 per cent in 2008. It is not unlikely that the EES and OMC played a role for 
these developments as they emphasised “activation” policies and a “life cycle approach to 
work”. However, it also needs to be born in mind that these developments are highly sensitive
to economic growth and that unemployment has considerably risen within the EU-15 from 7.1 
per cent in July 2008 to 9 per cent in June 2009 due to the current world-wide recession. In 
addition, we will see below that increasing employment rates have not contributed to 
reductions of poverty and social inequality, contrary to the ways in which the EU promoted 
this policy approach.  
Welfare state development is often measured by an examination of social expenditure.  
Table 1
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Data on overall social expenditure as a proportion of GDP confirm a range of studies on 
welfare state retrenchment that there have not been any major cutbacks (Castles 2007; Green-
Pedersen 2004; Pierson 2001a; Starke 2006) (4). However, social expenditure within the EU-
15 has decreased from 27.8 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 26.8 per cent in 2000. Whilst it went 
up again to 27.5 per cent in 2006, this level is still below that of the mid-1990s. In addition, 
this general picture conceals that the decrease of social expenditure has been more pronounced 
with a decline of 3.2 percentage points in Scandinavian countries whilst expenditure has still 
risen by 2.7 percentage points in Southern Europe (see Table 1).  
In addition, there are interesting differences in different policy fields. Whilst expenditure on 
sickness and disability benefits has increased from 9.3 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 9.7 per cent 
in 2006, expenditure on unemployment has decreased from 2.1 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 1.5 
per cent in 2006 and on pensions from 12.7 per cent of GDP to 12.1 per cent respectively.  
As the EES promotes “activation”, including active labour market policies such as training and
job opportunities, it is an interesting question whether the overall decline of labour market 
policy (LMP) expenditure conceals an increase in active labour market policy (ALMP) 
expenditure. However, measured in per cent of GDP, ALMP expenditure decreased from 1.06 
in 1996 to 0.88 per cent in 2006 (without Greece and Italy due to missing data, source: 
OECD). In line with the philosophy to minimise “benefit dependency”, the decrease of PLMP 
expenditure was even more significant, with a fall from 1.95 per cent in 1996 to 1.25 per cent 
in 2006 (all EU-15 countries).  
However, measuring LMP expenditure change in per cent of GDP is problematic because a 
decrease in spending might simply be due to decreasing unemployment whilst GDP remained 
stable or rose. It has therefore been suggested by the OECD (2003: 193f.) and authors such as 
Armingeon (2007: 915f.) that LMP spending data should be controlled for the level of 
unemployment by dividing the spending figures as per cent of GDP by the respective 
unemployment rates. As unemployment has continually decreased during the last one and a 
half decades it might therefore well be that absolute spending figures have actually increased.  
However, even if spending on LMP is standardised by unemployment rates, total labour 
market policy expenditure has not changed between 1996 and 2006 and decreased by 0.09 
points or 19 per cent between 1990 and 2006. Again, the decrease has been particularly 
pronounced in Scandinavian countries with an average decrease of 0.4 points within that 
period (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Standardised ALMP spending has on average increased by 0.03 points between 1996 and 
2006, however, it decreased on average in Scandinavian countries by 0.21 points within the 
same period. Between 1990 and 2006, standardised ALMP expenditure declined within the 
EU-13 (excluding Italy and Greece due to missing data) by 0.04 points. However, this measure
includes placement activities and administration cost. Expenditure on the sub-category of 
training measures decreased from 0.32 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 0.21 per cent in 2007. Even 
if standardised by unemployment rates, expenditure on training did not change between 1996 
and 2006 and went down by 0.02 points between 1990 and 2006 within the whole EU-15. It 
went down according to the standardised measure in both periods within Sweden, Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK.  
Standardised expenditure on unemployment benefits and early retirement (PLMP) has 
decreased in both periods within the EU-15, by 0.02 points between 1996 and 2006 and by 
0.05 points between 1990 and 2006. These figures appear to be very small, but this is due to 
dividing the figure of expenditure in per cent of GDP by the unemployment rate. In actual 
terms these figures demonstrate that there have been considerable cut backs in the area of 
unemployment policy, not just as proportion of GDP but also per unemployed population. 
Whilst the ratio of ALMP to total LMP expenditure has increased by almost 9 percentage 
points between 1996 and 2006, this is mainly due to cut backs in passive benefits, rather than 
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to a significant increase in ALMP expenditure. If benefit administration and placement 
activities are not included, this ratio only increased by almost 4 percentage points between 
1996 and 2001 and even decreased slightly by 0.1 percentage point between 1990 and 2006.  
Another interesting area of investigation is related to the “flexicurity” approach. As explained 
above, “flexicurity” aims at rendering labour markets more flexible, for example by making 
employment protection law less strict, offering more part-time and temporary work and 
enabling employees to change position through “life long learning” whilst unemployment 
benefits and ALMP should be in place to (temporarily) help those who lost their job.  
There are several indications that labour markets have indeed become more flexible during the 
last decade. According to the OECD’s indicator for employment protection which measures 
the strictness of labour market regulation in terms of “hiring and firing” employees, the level 
of protection has decreased within the EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg due to missing data) 
from 2.54 in 1996 to 2.08 in 2008. Another sign of increased labour market flexibility is that 
the share of temporary jobs within the labour market has increased from 12 per cent in 1996 to 
14.4 per cent in 2008. In addition, the proportion of part-time work rose from 16.3 per cent in 
1996 to 21.0 per cent in 2008, however part of that will also be due to increased female 
employment. Whilst according to those indicators labour market flexibility has increased, it is 
less clear whether the levels of “security” have remained the same or even improved as the 
previous section demonstrated that during the last one and a half decades standardised 
measures of support for unemployed people in form of ALMP has only slightly increased (but 
decreased as a proportion of GDP) whilst the provision of “passive” benefits has significantly 
declined.  
Another area that is addressed within the OMC SP is pension policy, promoting “sustainable 
and adequate” pensions. An analysis of spending figures demonstrates that expenditure on
pensions has fallen from 12.7 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 12.1 in 2006. However, these figures 
do not take into account the proportion of the population aged 65 and over which increased 
from 15.1 to 16.4 per cent within the same period of time. In other words, if the increasing 
share of the population on which these pensions are spent is taken into account, the drop in 
expenditure is even more significant. If pension expenditure is standardised by the proportion 
of the population aged 65 and over it decreased within the EU-15 by 0.05 points between 2000 
and 2006 and by 0.1 point between 1996 and 2006. The drop of expenditure is strongest in the 
continental member states with a decrease of 0.13 (0.05) between 1996 (2000) and 2006. This 
decrease in public pension expenditure corresponds to the fact that the ratio of the relative 
median income of people aged 65+ in comparison to those under 65 years of age has decreased 
from 0.87 in 1996 to 0.83 in 2006 within the EU-15 and that poverty (60 per cent of median 
income threshold) amongst those aged 65 and over has increased from 20 to 21 per cent 
between 1996 and 2006, and even from 17 to 21 per cent between 2000 and 2006.  
An examination of more general developments regarding poverty (here measured by the 60 per 
cent below median income threshold) and social inequality also reveals that the situation has 
deteriorated rather than improved during the last decade.  
Table 3 
The poverty rate has increased from 15 per cent in 2000 when the OMC SPSI was introduced 
(or 16 per cent in 1996) to 17 per cent in 2007 in the EU-15. The increase has been particularly 
strong within the Scandinavian countries, Luxembourg and Germany.  
Whilst joblessness is indeed a major risk-factor for poverty, the spread of activation policies 
during recent years has not helped to reduce the proportion of the “working poor” which stood 
at 8 percent in both 1996 and 2007 within the EU-15.  
Income inequality, measured by the gini coefficient, has also risen in the EU-15 from 29 in 
1997 to 30 in 2007. Again, inequality is rising particularly strongly in countries with greater 
income equality in the mid-1990s such as the Scandinavian countries (see Table 4). A similar 
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picture is emerging when analysing the ratio of the highest income quintile to that of the 
lowest income quintile. In 1997, the highest income quintile received a total income that was 
4.7 times higher than that of the lowest income quintile. This ratio had fallen to 4.5 in 2000 but 
rose again to 4.9 in 2007.  
Table 4 
In summary, whilst some of these developments in policy outcomes, particularly the cutbacks 
of “passive” unemployment benefits and more flexible labour markets, are in line with
conservative or neo-liberal interpretations of “activation policies”, other trends such as 
decreasing levels of ALMP in comparison to the early 1990s as well as increasing poverty and 
social inequality are not in line with the OMC's ambitions.  
5. Conclusion   
This article aimed to review and combine arguments from OMC “optimists” and “pessimists”, 
particularly in relation to the question of whether the OMC is able to strengthen European 
welfare states within a context of rising external and internal pressures such as globalisation, 
European integration, structural economic and demographic change. The analysis of the EES 
and OMC SPSI policy content concluded that whilst both strategies are still subordinated to 
the EU’s goal to become the most competitive economy in the world and contain a range of 
measures that have potentially retrenching effects, the OMC SPSI in particular also emphasises 
the fight against poverty, social inclusion, skills and equal opportunities which might have 
consolidating or even expansionary effects if interpreted and applied accordingly.  
“Optimists” within the OMC literature have argued that whilst the OMC is less likely to have a
direct effect on programmes, there are two ways in which it could have an impact on national 
policies. The first is an influence on policy frames and discourses through the dissemination of 
ideas, peer reviews and policy learning which, subsequently, might inform policy-making and 
translate into policy outcomes. The second is the mobilisation and integration of previously 
marginalised policy actors into policy-making processes who can then lobby for improved 
social policies (Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Jacobsson 2004; Visser 2009; Zeitlin 2009).  
However, the examination of developments within social spending, passive and active LMP 
and pension expenditure as well as levels of poverty and inequality demonstrated that on 
average there are no signs of improvement or even clear trends of retrenchment in those areas, 
particularly within the Scandinavian and continental European countries. As discussed in the 
introduction, the approach chosen in this article did not provide an insight into the “black 
boxes” that lie between different factors for national policy-making (of which the OMC is only 
one potential factor), policy change at the national level and policy outcomes. However, on the 
basis of existing qualitative accounts of how the OMC has or has not operated as a catalyst 
within national policy-making, there is only a relatively small range of possibilities of how 
these outcomes can be interpreted. As this article sought to re-examine the arguments put 
forward by OMC “pessimists” and “optimists”, the remainder of the conclusion will elaborate 
how both camps would interpret these results and propose an alternative interpretation that 
combines aspects of both perspectives.  
1. OMC “pessimists” would regard these results as an indicator that the OMC did not have 
any influence on the policy developments that led to those outcomes, neither through an 
influence on policy frames nor the mobilisation of marginalised actors. They would 
interpret non-growing or even decreasing social expenditure, stagnating poverty and 
increasing social inequality as a quasi-automatic, un-coordinated response by EU 
member states to rising external and internal pressures on welfare states. However, this 
contradicts findings from a range of OMC and “activation” policy scholars claiming that 
the activation discourse has spread across Europe and that the OMC may have helped 
promoting this approach (amongst many authors: Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 
2004; De la Porte 2008; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 
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2007; Van Berkel and Nornemann Møller 2002; Zeitlin, Pochet, and Magnusson 2005). 
2. OMC “optimists” would still argue that the OMC has influenced policy frames and
discourses in ways that promote a “modernisation” or “strengthening” of welfare states 
and therefore potentially strengthen “social Europe”. However, they would struggle to 
explain the empirical evidence demonstrating that actual spending patterns and welfare 
state performance did not improve or even deteriorated during the last decade as they 
would not concede that these OMC-informed discourses did not subsequently translate 
into policies and remained “symbolic” politics or “window dressing”, unable to counter-
balance pressures arising from “negative integration” as well as other external and 
internal pressures on welfare states.  
3. This article argues that a combination of some of the arguments put forward by OMC 
“optimists” and “pessimists” can result in a more fruitful way of interpreting the 
presented evidence on welfare state performance. From this perspective, it is possible 
that the OMC has contributed to the promotion of social policy concepts such as 
“activation” and the “sustainability” of social protection systems whilst the 
interpretation, policy translation and implementation of these concepts has been shaped 
and limited by external and internal pressures on welfare states, including not only 
“negative integration” and globalisation, but also demographic change and the transition 
to post-industrialism (e.g. Bonoli 2005; Pierson 2001b; Starke 2006; Taylor-Gooby 
2009). In other words, whilst “policy learning” may have taken place, it occurred in less 
voluntary and more confined ways than assumed by the “optimists”. This perspective 
would stress that whilst the OMC does not openly promote welfare state retrenchment, 
many of the policy approaches it endorses are contradictory or at least open to 
interpretations and ways of implementation that are compatible with welfare state 
retrenchment. The activation discourse is a prime example in this context. The OMC 
presents “activation” as a “positive” discourse, aiming to strengthen social inclusion by 
helping more people into work and reducing poverty. However, activation policies are 
implemented in a context of significant constraints on government budgets, a European 
single market and competitive pressures from further abroad. Budgetary pressures act as 
barriers to expanding investments into active labour market and other social inclusion 
policies. Competitive pressures make more progressive taxation reforms difficult which 
could help to increase public revenues and have redistributive effects (5). If we can 
assume in line with various OMC and “activation” policy scholars that the OMC 
contributed to a consolidation or even spread of the activation concept across Europe, it 
is therefore likely that “activation” has been implemented in ways that emphasise the 
need to “end welfare dependency” (leading to benefit cuts and restrictions of social 
rights) without investing into appropriate alternative ways of increasing social inclusion. 
The OMC may have provided discourses and justifications rendering policy reforms 
acceptable to a range of policy actors and the public. If it is true that the OMC 
encouraged the inclusion of marginalised political actors into policy-making processes 
(e.g. Zeitlin 2009), this would have contributed to convincing them of these new policy 
frameworks, thus preventing potential opposition or even transforming it into political 
support. However, here it must be stressed that the ways in which “activation” and other 
OMC-supported concepts are translated into concrete policies will depend on a variety 
of factors related to the concrete political and institutional settings in the different 
member states. It is therefore not impossible that OMC-supported “activation” led to 
improvements in welfare state performance in individual countries. However, the 
empirical data presented in section four suggest that if the OMC played a role in policy-
making, and be it just at the level of providing general policy frames, national policy 
actors seem on average to have interpreted and implemented the OMC and “activation”
frameworks in ways that did not improve or even deteriorate welfare state performance. 
If that interpretation holds, the OMC has not been powerful enough to prevent welfare 
state retrenchment against a variety of external and internal pressures or may even have 
contributed to it. However, further comparative qualitative research is required to 
examine the ways in which the OMC is or is not translated into concrete policies and 
what other factors have influenced recent policy changes and policy outcomes.  
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Endnotes  
(*) Many thanks to Sandra Kröger, an anonymous referee and the participants in the session on “EU’s ‘soft’
law and Europeanisation” at the UACES conference ‘Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2008 - Rethinking the 
European Union’, Edinburgh, UK, 1-3 September 2008, particularly Waltraud Schelkle, Sotirios Zartaloudis, 
Kyriakos Moumoutzis and Brian Ardy for helpful comments on previous versions of this article. The usual 
disclaimer applies.  
(1) This definition combines elements of competing definitions and measurements of welfare state 
retrenchment (see amongst many Castles 2007; for quantitative approaches, Scruggs 2006 and Korpi 2003 for 
the welfare rights/generosity approach and Esping-Andersen 1990 as “father” of the outcome-based 
approach), because the evaluation in section three includes both spending and outcomes.  
(2) In this context, “strengthening” social Europe therefore only partly overlaps with “welfare state 
expansion”. “Strengthening” social Europe relates both to the EU and member state levels whilst “welfare 
state expansion” only refers to the national level. “Welfare state expansion” also focuses more on an increase 
in welfare state expenditure and expansion of welfare rights, something that the OMC arguably never 
explicitly supported whilst it focussed more on improved policy outcomes such as reduced poverty and 
greater social inclusion.  
(3) Public debt within the EU-15 has indeed fallen from 69.9 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 60.4 per cent in 
2007.  
(4) This might partly be due to methodological problems as, amongst other problems, social expenditure as 
per cent of GDP is sensitive to economic growth rates (see Castles 2007; Green-Pedersen 2004 and Scruggs 
2006 for details).  
(5) A recent review of taxation policy in the EU demonstrates that the rates on corporate and high level 
personal income have decreased considerably during the last decade whilst indirect taxes (e.g. VAT, excise 
duties) which have regressive effects have increased (see European Commission 2009).  
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Table 1: Total social expenditure, per cent of GDP (changes in italics) 
Source: Eurostat 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 1996 2000 2006 2000-2006 1996-2006
Austria 28.9 28.4 28.5 0.1 -0.4
Germany 29.4 29.3 28.7 -0.6 -0.7
France 30.6 29.5 31.1 1.6 0.5
Belgium 28 26.5 30.1 3.6 2.1
Luxembourg 21.2 19.6 20.4 0.8 -0.8
Netherlands 29.6 26.4 29.3 2.9 -0.3
Mean 28 26.6 28 1.4 0
Denmark 31.2 28.9 29.1 0.2 -2.1
Sweden 33.1 30.1 30.7 0.6 -2.4
Finland 31.4 25.1 26.2 1.1 -5.2
Mean 31.9 28 28.7 0.7 -3.2
Italy 24.3 24.7 26.6 1.9 2.3
Spain 21.5 20.3 20.9 0.6 -0.6
Greece 20.5 23.5 24.2 0.7 3.7
Portugal 20.2 21.7 25.4 3.7 5.2
Mean 21.6 22.6 24.3 1.7 2.7
Ireland 17.6 13.9 18.2 4.3 0.6
UK 27.4 26.4 26.4 0 -1
Mean 22.5 20.2 22.3 2.1 -0.2
EU-15 27.8 26.8 27.5 0.7 -0.3
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Table 2: Total labour market policy expenditure, per cent of 
GDP/unemployment rate (changes in italics) 
Source: OECD, Dataset Public Expenditure and Participant Stocks in LMP. Italy and Greece have been omitted from this set due to 
missing data. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 1990 1996 2006 1996-2006 1990-2006
Austria 0.41 0.48 0.44 -0.04 0.04
Germany 0.37 0.42 0.28 -0.14 -0.09
France 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.01 0
Belgium 0.41 0.32 0.41 0.09 0.01
Luxembourg 0.65 0.35 0.35 0 -0.3
Netherlands 0.49 0.7 0.74 0.04 0.25
Mean 0.43 0.42 0.41 -0.01 -0.01
Denmark 0.65 0.79 0.82 0.03 0.18
Sweden 1.42 0.44 0.33 -0.11 -1.09
Finland 0.61 0.35 0.33 -0.02 -0.28
Mean 0.89 0.53 0.5 -0.03 -0.4
Spain 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.15 0.05
Portugal 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.06
Mean 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.06
Ireland 0.28 0.3 0.33 0.03 0.06
UK 0.18 0.13 0.09 -0.04 -0.09
Mean 0.23 0.22 0.21 0 -0.02
EU-13 0.47 0.37 0.38 0 -0.09
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Table 3: Poverty rate, 60 per cent of media income, in per cent (changes in 
italics) 
Source: Eurostat 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 1997 2001 2007 2001-2007 1997-2007
Austria 13.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 -1.0
Germany 12.0 11.0 15.0 4.0 3.0
France 15.0 13.0 13.0 0.0 -2.0
Belguim 14.0 13.0 15.0 2.0 1.0
Luxembourg 11.0 12.0 14.0 2.0 3.0
Netherlands 10.0 11.0 10.0 -1.0 0.0
Mean 12.5 12.0 13.2 1.2 0.7
Denmark 10.0 10.0 12.0 2.0 2.0
Sweden 8.0 9.0 11.0 2.0 3.0
Finland 8.0 11.0 13.0 2.0 5.0
Mean 8.7 10.0 12.0 2.0 3.3
Italy 19.0 19.0 20.0 1.0 1.0
Spain 20.0 19.0 20.0 1.0 0.0
Greece 22.0 20.0 18.0 -2.0 -4.0
Portugal 21.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 -1.0
Mean 20.5 19.5 19.5 0.0 -1.0
Ireland 19.0 21.0 18.0 -3.0 -1.0
UK 18.0 18.0 19.0 1.0 1.0
Mean 18.5 19.5 18.5 -1.0 0.0
EU-15 16.0 15.0 17.0 2.0 1.0
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Table 4: Income inequality, Gini coefficient (changes in italics) 
Source: Eurostat 
 1997 2001 2007 2001-2007 1997-2007
Austria 25.0 24.0 26.0 2.0 1.0
Germany 25.0 25.0 30.0 5.0 5.0
France 29.0 27.0 26.0 -1.0 -3.0
Belguim 27.0 28.0 26.0 -2.0 -1.0
Luxembourg 25.0 27.0 27.0 0.0 2.0
Netherlands 26.0 27.0 28.0 1.0 2.0
Mean 26.2 26.3 27.2 0.8 1.0
Denmark 20.0 22.0 25.0 3.0 5.0
Sweden 21.0 24.0 23.0 -1.0 2.0
Finland 22.0 27.0 26.0 -1.0 4.0
Mean 21.0 24.3 24.7 0.3 3.7
Italy 31.0 29.0 32.0 3.0 1.0
Spain 35.0 33.0 31.0 -2.0 -4.0
Greece 35.0 33.0 34.0 1.0 -1.0
Portugal 36.0 37.0 37.0 0.0 1.0
Mean 34.3 33.0 33.5 0.5 -0.8
Ireland 33.0 29.0 31.0 2.0 -2.0
UK 30.0 35.0 33.0 -2.0 3.0
Mean 31.5 32.0 32.0 0.0 0.5
EU-15 29.0 29.0 30.0 1.0 1.0
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